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positive and, therefore, they are more likely to take proactive measures to stimulate the provincial economy.
There is an ongoing debate regarding the role of government in the economy and financial markets. On the one side, the development view suggests that government intervention in financial markets promote economic development by channelling credit to the sectors of economy prioritized by the governments. However, this view is less supported by previous studies (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2002; Caprio and Peria, 2002; La Porta et al., 2002) , which consistently show a negative relation between government intervention and economic growth. On the opposite side, the political view emphasizes the political objectives of government intervention in financial markets (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; Brown and Dinc, 2005; Dinc, 2005) and argues that politicians in power are inclined to exploit financial resources, particularly those owned or controlled by the government, to appease their supporters who subsequently return the favour through voting, political contributions and bribes (e.g., Kornai, 1979; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) .
Despite the accumulated empirical evidence supporting the political view, there has been limited research on politically motivated and driven actions taken by commercial banks in terms of bank loans.
We choose China to investigate our research question because the problem of political intervention is expected to be greater in China as compared with other emerging economies. First, despite the significant economy reform and remarkable economic development, China's central and local government maintain substantial influences over the overall economy by controlling the allocation of key economic resources, like land and credit.
3 Second, China's rapid growth is mainly attributed to the globalization of trade, but China has yet to globalize its banking sector (Berger et al., 2009 ). China's banking sector remains dominated by four colossal state-owned banks (i.e., the Big Four banks) 4 , which account for about three-quarters of industry assets. Finally, China features the coexistence of political centralization and fiscal decentralization. Specifically, the personnel management of provincial leaders is solely controlled by the central government, and the provincial economic performance is a crucial indicator in personnel evaluation. As such, the central government rewards and punishes local officials through a yardstick competition on the basis of regional economic performance (Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin et al., 2000; Li and Zhou, 2005) .
5
Using provincial data from 2002 to 2011, we find that the growth rate of bank loans increases with the political pressure on local officials. This relation is significant and robust when controlling for macroeconomic factors as well as the personal characteristics of provincial leaders. Intuitively, our results indicate that provincial leaders have stronger influences on the state-owned banks, while other domestic and foreign banks don't seem to be affected. Moreover, the uneven institutional development across regions in China allows us to examine the extent to which the association is affected by the degree of banking marketization. Our results show that the impact of political pressures on the growth of bank loans is moderated in regions with a higher level of banking marketization, suggesting that economic liberalization is effective in preventing government intervention in financial institutions.
We then shift our focus to the efficiency of bank lending and the quality of bank loans. Following Podpiera (2006), we define efficiency as the sensitivity of lending growth rate to provincial profitability. Our results show that bank lending is less commercially oriented (a higher sensitivity level) and have much lower quality when local officials are facing greater political pressures. Overall, these results confirm our inferences drawing on the political view that the government forces banks to increase lending to serve their politically agenda rather than to achieve greater economic objectives, and loans issued under such circumstance suffer lower efficiency and quality.
We conduct a number of robustness checks to test the validity of our results. First, we repeat the main analyses using the excessive growth of bank loans as the dependent variable, and our results remain unchanged. Second, we find that a province 5 The political motives of Chinese local officials arise mainly from political pressure empowered by the performance-based promotion scheme rather than the campaign-driven political actions that are pervasive in western countries.
significantly increases its bank credit supply in the last two years of a five-year-plan cycle if its GDP growth in the first three years falls behind the target set in the five-year plan. This evidence reinforces our argument that local officials rely heavily on credit supply to stimulate the regional GDP in order to achieve better scores in the performance evaluation system. Finally, our results remain qualitatively unaltered when
we employ the change model to better identify the causal relationship between political pressure and the banks' lending behaviour.
This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, our findings add evidence to the literature on the political influences on bank lending (La Porta et al., 2002; Brown and Dinc, 2005; Dinc, 2005) . To our best knowledge, our paper is the first to provide direct evidence of the role played by political pressure in determining the banks' lending behaviour in China. Second, our paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on the political incentives of government officials, both in the context of China and in general (Besley and Case, 1992; Maskin et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005) . In particular, our paper is closely related to Li and Zhou (2005) , who find that the likelihood of promotion for provincial leaders is positively associated with the regional economic performance. We, however, focus on the political pressure on provincial leaders and its link with bank lending decisions. Finally, our paper contributes to the debate on the role of government in transitional economies. Frye and Shleifer (1996) put forward the "helping hand" and the "grabbing hand"
approaches. The former portrays the idea that the government seeks to guide and stimulate economic growth by reallocating financial resources, while the latter argues that government officials do not aim to maximize social welfare but pursue their own selfish objectives. Our study provides evidence consistent with the latter argument.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background. Section 3 develops our research hypotheses. Section 4 explains the research design, including the measurement of variables, model specification, sample selection and data sources. Section 5 reports the empirical results and their interpretations. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional background

China's economy and economic plans
The growing interest among academics, investors and regulators around the world in the Chinese-style capitalism stems from China's increasing economic importance in the world. China has been growing at around 10% per year over the last three decades, and in 2010 China surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy according to nominal GDP and purchasing power parity (PPP China's first five-year plan covered the period of 1953-1957, with a focus on "developing heavy industries". Since then, China has implemented eleven five-year plans, with the twelfth five-year guideline started in 2011.
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The formulation of the five-year plan is a top-down process. In response to the national five-year plan set by the central government, each province also stipulates a provincial-level five-year plan with adjustments as appropriate. Additionally, local governments have to present official annual reports, review current year's achievements and challenges, and set up targets (not restricted to economics targets) for the coming year.
The most relevant and important figure in the official documents is the target of 6 Details can be found in the article in The Financial Times titled "China's leap forward: overtaking the US as world's biggest economy" (October 08, 2014) . 7 The idea of five-year plans originated from the former Soviet Union, whose philosophy was that the socialist economy should progress based on plans. Countries (including non-socialist countries) that have used or still use five-year plans include China, Cuba, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania, Vietnam, Argentina, Bhutan, Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Pakistan, South Korea and Malaysia . 8 The name of the eleventh five-year programme was changed from "plan" to "guideline". This was done to reflect China's transition from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy, as well as the more democratic and transparent formulation process.
GDP growth rate. Economic performance is a key indicator used in the personnel evaluation system in China (Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005) . This has created growing criticism in recent years because the local governments tend to be eager for instant success and thus invest in projects that may not maximize long-term benefits.
Motivated by career concerns, local officials may even engage in statistical falsification.
As a result, some scholars have called for the GDP growth target to be abolished in the official documents. 
The political system in China
China is highly politically centralized and has five hierarchical levels of government: central, provincial, prefecture, county, and township. 10 The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) acts as the supreme decision-making organization of this "multidivisional" system , which ultimately controls the mobility of government officials within the system (Huang, 2002; Li and Zhou, 2005 provincial leaders in local economic development (Qian and Xu, 1993) . On the other hand, the provincial leaders have become more liable for the corresponding results arising from their decisions.
In addition, China's economic reforms also triggered the reform of its personnel control system. This has shifted the focus of personnel evaluation criteria away from political loyalty, which was the only important criterion for promotion prior to the reform, to economic performance (Chen et al., 2005 
China's banking sector
China has a bank-based financial system, with the banking sector accounting for two-thirds of the economy's capital, more than double the share in the US and 1.5 times the share in most other economies (Farrell et al., 2006 ). China's banking sector is characterized by the dominance of the state ownership of banks, which allows for government intervention in the decision making of those banks (Firth et al., 2009 ). Prior to the late 1990s, the primary role of China's banking sector was to channel low-cost capital to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), even poorly performing ones, because of their scale and government ownership. Moreover, the banks, especially the local bank branches, were subject to great pressure from local officials to grant loans to politically favoured enterprises. As a result, policy lending was a salient characteristic of the banking system.
As a consequence of the policy-directed lending, the Chinese banks had accumulated enormous amounts of non-performing loans (NPLs). According to the statistics, the state banks' share of NPLs over total loans was 20% in 1994. This ratio increased to 25% in 1997 and then to 35% in 2000 (Tung, 2002; Firth et al., 2009 14 Finally, the government deregulated the banking sector by allowing several joint-stock commercial banks, city banks, and rural and urban credit cooperatives to operate in China. Moreover, foreign banks were also allowed to establish branches in China, and to make strategic minority investments in many of the state-owned commercial banks. Figure 1 summarizes the structure of China's commercial banking industry.
Literature review and hypotheses
Previous research consistently suggests that government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent bank performance and economic growth (e.g., Caprio and Peria, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Bonin et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2009) . This is broadly consistent with the "political view"
that government-owned banks are used by politicians to serve their own political goals. Relative to the effects of government ownership of banks, the question of how bank lending is politically motivated has been much less studied. Sapienza (2004) finds that the interest rates charged by government-owned banks in Italy are associated with the local power of the party that controls the bank. Dinc (2005) shows that governmentowned banks tend to increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that politically connected firms in Pakistan borrow more from state-owned banks and are more likely to default. However, the empirical evidence from China is very limited, with the exception of Ho et al. (2013) , who find an increase in lending made by Chinese state-owned banks during the recent financial crisis when they were mandated by the government to extend credit. The interpretation is that China's state-owned banking system, as a policy instrument, is subsumed into the government's macroeconomic agenda.
Based on our discussion of the institutional background and the extant literature, the coexistence of political centralization and fiscal decentralization in China allows for a yardstick competition to take place among local officials. On the one hand, the personnel control is centralized in the hands of central government and economic performance is a crucial indicator used in personnel evaluations. On the other hand, the local governments have substantial influences over the local financial resources, including bank credit. As a result, in order to build up the economy and thus relieve the personal political pressure, provincial leaders are likely to increase bank lending by exerting influence over the banks in their jurisdictions. Moreover, the political influence is expected to be greater for Big Four state-owned banks, which are much more politically pressurized and undertake more non-economic obligations than other banks.
Previous literature also suggests that politically motivated lending mainly exists in state-owned banks (La Porta et al., 2002; Dinc, 2005) . Thus, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: There is a positive association between the political pressure on provincial leaders and the growth of bank loans.
H2: The predicted positive relation from H1 is more pronounced for the Big
Four banks than for others.
The institutional environment in China varies across regions because different regions are moving towards a market-oriented economy at different paces (Chen et al., 2006; Lai et al., 2013) . Prior literature documents that regional marketization plays an essential role in affecting the financial practices of Chinese firms, including capital structure (Li et al., 2009; Li et al., 2011) , corporate fraud (Chen et al., 2006) , dividend payouts (Chen et al., 2009 ), investment comovement , foreign direct investment (Du et al., 2008) and so forth. In a related study, Firth et al. (2009) find that political connections are less important and financial performance are more important in determining credit allocation in regions with more developed banking sectors.
Applying this logic to our setting, we hypothesize that the level of regional banking liberalization moderates the political influence on bank lending:
H3: The positive association between political pressure and the growth of bank loans is weaker in regions with more developed banking sectors.
As a result of political interference in the credit market, the lending decisions of banks may not be made on a commercial basis but instead out of political considerations.
Under the system of relative performance evaluation, local politicians are only interested in the achievements reaped from apparent short-term success, even at the expense of the long-term prosperity. According to our description in earlier sections, local officials are promoted almost entirely based on their locality's growth rates, giving them a huge incentive to meet or even beat the GDP growth targets. Once local officials are promoted to a higher rank, the losses or bad debts of banks incurred during their premiership will become the liabilities of their successors. As such, we predict a negative association between political pressure and bank lending efficiency as follows:
H4: Bank lending is less commercially oriented under greater political pressure.
H5:
There is a negative association between political pressure and loan quality.
Research design and data
Measurement of main variables
Bank credit growth
Following the vast prior literature, we measure the main dependent variable, growth of bank loans (∆Loani,t), as the percentage change in province i's total bank loans from year t-1 to year t. To disentangle the effect of political pressure on banks with different ownership, we measure the loan growth as the annual growth rate of bank lending from the Big Four banks, other domestic banks and foreign banks, respectively, when testing hypothesis H2.
Political pressure
China's local officials come under pressure regarding the regional GDP growth rate because it is directly related to their prospects of promotion or termination (Wu, 2000; Rawski, 2001; Li and Zhou, 2005) . Following the economic growth target set in the national five-year plan, local governments set their own targets in the regional fiveyear plan. We employ two measures to capture the political pressure: GAP5YRi,t is the difference between the target GDP growth rate committed in province i's five-year plan and its actual GDP growth rate in year t; and GAPNBi,t is the difference between the average GDP growth rate of province i's adjacent neighbours and its actual growth rate in year t. 15 Both measures are scaled by the actual GDP growth rate of province i in year t. Higher values of the measures indicate greater political pressure on the local officials.
Banking market development
15 According to the classification of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), China can be classified into four regions in terms of their level of economic development. The eastern region includes the following 10 provinces and municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai and Zhejiang. The central region includes the following 6 provinces: Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Shanxi. The western region includes the following 12 provinces and municipalities: Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. The northeastern region includes Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin. For instance, Beijing's GAPNBt is computed as the mean of the actual GDP growth rates of the 9 eastern regions other than Beijing minus the actual GDP growth rate of Beijing in year t.
China's private firms are discriminated against by the state-dominated financial markets, which impede the progress of marketization (Brandt and Li, 2003 Table A .1 presents the marketization index by province and year. Individually, Zhejiang has the highest average value, followed by Guangdong and Jiangsu. The province with the least developed banking market is Jilin, followed by Heilongjiang and Gansu. Beyond this, the eastern regions have higher values than the other regions in general, which is consistent with the uneven economic growth in China's regions.
Model specification
Test of H1 and H2
To test hypothesis H1, concerning the influence of political pressure on bank loan growth, we estimate the following model:
where, for province i and year t, ∆Loan is the annual growth rate of bank loans. Pressure is the political pressure, separately measured by GAP5YR or GAPNB as defined in Section is the total value of secondary industry divided by GDP in province i and year t.
In addition to these macroeconomic factors, we also control for a set of characteristics of the provincial leaders. 17 Age is measured as the logarithm of the age of the provincial committee secretary. Age60 is a dummy variable that equals one if the leader is 60 or older, and zero otherwise. Age is a critical variable determining political turnover (Li and Zhou, 2005) . Officials who are 60 or older will be forced to retire within five years under the 65-years-of-age retirement rule, making them less politically motivated to promote economic growth (Xu and Wang, 2010) . Tenure is the number of years for which the provincial leader has been in the post. Promotion is a dummy variable that equals one if the provincial leader was promoted from within the provincial government. Education measures the level of education, set to 3, 2, 1, or 0 for PhD, Master's, Bachelor's or lower, respectively. Experience measures expertise in economics and management. It is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the provincial leader previously held a post in the provincial or a higher level of government in which he/she was directly involved in formulating and implementing economic plans. 18 The variable definitions are presented in Table A .2.
To take a closer look at whether the political influence in bank loans varies among banks of different ownership, as posited in hypothesis H2, we re-examine Eq.
(1) and disaggregate the total loans into loans issued by the Big Four banks, other domestic banks and foreign banks, respectively. If our hypothesis H2 holds, then 1 should be more significant when the Big Four banks act as the lenders.
Test of H3
To test hypothesis H3 that the effect of political pressure on bank lending is attenuated in regions with a higher degree of banking marketization, we estimate the equation as follows:
where the degree of regional marketization is measured using the financial marketization index that is developed by the National Economic Research Institute of
China. Each year provinces are grouped into three terciles. NERI equals three if the province-year is ranked as the highest tercile, two for the intermediate, and one for the lowest. Thus, we expect the coefficient on × ( 3 ) is significantly negative.
Test of H4
To test the influence of political pressure on lending efficiency, we follow Podpiera (2006) and estimate the following equation:
where Surplus is a proxy for the profitability of all enterprises in province i, computed as the ratio of operating surplus to GDP in province i.
A positive relation between
Surplus and ∆ can be interpreted as an indication of growing commercial orientation. Applying this logic, if political pressure reduces bank lending efficiency, then we should observe that the coefficient on × ( 3 ) is significantly negative.
Test of H5
19 Podpiera (2006) 
where NLoan is measured as the percentage of non-performing loans to total loans.
M_structure is a proxy for market structure, measured as the proportion of total assets held by the four largest banks in China. The other variables share the same definitions as those in Section 4.2.1. The independent variable, Pressure, is lagged at least one period with respect to the dependent variable, NLoan, to allow for the fact that it takes time for political pressure to have its full impact on the loan quality. Since the data on loan quality is only available from 2009 to 2013, our sample is reduced to a smaller size. If hypothesis H5 holds, then 1 should be significantly positive.
Sample and data
Our province-year observations. Tibet province is excluded from our sample due to data unavailability. We also delete observations without GDP growth goals. The sample selection process yields a final sample of 294 observations (province-year).
[Insert Table 1] 20 Our control variables are less than those in Schaeck et al (2009) because of different research setting. More than half of the leaders are older than 60 years. On average, provincial leaders hold the office for three and a half years and 42.3% of them were promoted from with the provincial government. The leaders have a Bachelor's degree or higher on average, and 42% of them have previous work experience in economics departments. Table 4 reports the regression results of testing hypothesis H1. In the first two columns, we report the regressions with GAP5YR as the independent variable.
Empirical results
Summary statistics and correlations
Regardless of whether the characteristics of provincial leaders are included, the coefficients on GAP5YR are statistically positive (in column 2: coefficient=0.072, tstat=2.114). This supports our conjecture that regional banks are forced to expand credit when local officials face the pressure of not being able to achieve the economic goals.
Similar results are observed in columns (3) and (4) (in column 4: coefficient=0.076, tstat=1.869), where GAPNB is used as the independent variable. This implies that local officials have greater pressure and are more likely to push local banks to issue credit when they are outperformed by the adjacent provincial leaders.
[Insert Table 4] The signs of the coefficients on control variables are broadly consistent with the predicted ones. For instance, the coefficients on ∆GDP are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the growth rate of loans is primarily driven by regional economic growth. In addition, the coefficients on ∆Deposit are positive and significant, which is consistent with Jayaratne and Morgan's (2000) through bank credit. shown in the rest of columns, the relation becomes insignificant for other domestic banks and foreign banks, whose lending decisions are less likely to be made on a political basis. Overall, the results suggest that the primary role of state-owned banks is to serve policy goals rather than seek profit, which partially explains why state-owned banks underperform their foreign counterparts in China (Berger et al., 2009 ).
Subsample analysis: Test of H2
[Insert Table 5 ]
Banking marketization, political pressure and credit growth: Test of H3
According to hypothesis H3, the relationship between political pressure and credit growth may not be uniform between regions with more and less developed banking sectors. Our results from testing this hypothesis are reported in Table 6 . Consistent with Firth et al. (2009) , banking marketization changes the effect of political pressure on credit growth. Specifically, the coefficients on × are significantly negative for both measures of political pressure, indicating that the institutional environment, especially the banking liberalization, is an important mechanism that moderates political interference in bank decisions.
[Insert Table 6 ] Table 7 presents the regression results of testing hypothesis H4. The coefficients on Surplus are positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that on average the profitability of regional enterprises is an important determinant of lending growth.
Political pressure and lending efficiency: Test of H4
However, this positive relation is moderated by political pressure. Specifically, the coefficients on × are significantly negative. This confirms our hypothesis H4 that banks do not appear to take corporate profitability into account when local governments are subject to great political pressure.
[Insert Table 7] 5.6 Political pressure and loan quality: Test of H5 Table 8 shows the relation between political pressure and the quality of loans. As conjectured, the current pressure is significantly positively associated with nonperforming loans in the subsequent three years. When political pressure arises from the inter-party competition, i.e., GAPNB is the dependent variable, the impact of pressure on loan quality gradually decreases across periods, with the effect being the strongest for the t+1 year. In addition, the proportion of secondary industry to local economy is another determinant of bad debts, which supports the statistics of the CBRC showing that the secondary industry contributes to the largest share of non-performing loans in China.
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[Insert Table 8 ]
Robustness analyses
Political pressure and excessive loan growth
As a robustness check, we repeat our analyses using excessive loan growth as the dependent variable. A widely used approach explains the expected level of credit growth by a set of macroeconomic variables (Hofmann, 2001; Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005) .
However, this approach may not be applicable in China. Because bank credit serves mainly as a policy tool in China, and it is less reliant on market factors than it is in developed economies (Koivu, 2009 ). In addition, this type of estimation requires data over a long period, which is unavailable in China. Excessive credit growth is also defined as credit expansion beyond the growth of the real economy (Honohan, 1997; Adams et al., 1998) . Following this definition, we measure the excessive credit growth (Ex∆Loani,t) in the present study as the growth rate of bank loans minus the GDP growth rate for province i in year t. As can be seen in Table 9 , results are similar to those reported in previous tables. These results reinforce our evidence of the political influence on the bank lending behaviour.
[Insert Table 9 ]
Mid-term political pressure and loan growth
One may argue that, if loan growth is indeed driven by political pressure, we should observe more aggressive credit growth in the later years of a five-year cycle if the local government has failed to achieve its economic goals in the earlier years. To investigate this issue, we re-examine Eq.
(1) replacing the independent variable with LagGAP5YR, which equals 1 if the average value of GDP growth for the first three years is below the target growth rate committed in the five-year plan, and 0 otherwise. Table   10 presents the results. As shown in both columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on LagGAP5YR are positive and significant at the 10% level. This corroborates our argument that local governments that have underperformed relative to their economy target in the earlier years during a five-year plan may attempt to catch up in the later years by expanding bank credit.
[Insert Table 10 ]
Political pressure and loan growth: Change specifications
It is argued in prior literature (Li, 2010a; Kravet and Muslu, 2013 ) that change methodology can better prevent statistical inferences from correlated omitted variables and reverse causality problems. In an attempt to address the potential concerns, we repeat all analysis by employing change specifications, in which all variables except for dummy are measured by the annual change from year t-1 to year t. As shown in (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of total loans made by Big Four state-owned banks. In models (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of total loans made by other domestic banks. Finally, in models (5) and (6), the annual growth rate of total loans made by foreign banks is used. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A 
Indep. Variables
Shortfall of GDP growth to target growth rates
GAP5YR
The target GDP growth rate set in province's five-year plan divided by the actual GDP growth rate, and then minus 1.
Shortfall of GDP growth to neighbour's growth rate GAPNB Average GDP growth rate of adjacent provinces divided by the actual GDP growth rate, and then minus 1. 
Control Variables
